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Catherine Malabou and ‘the feeling of a new responsibility’1  
 
Introduction 
Plasticity is a deeply educational concept and is at least as old as Hegel’s thinking on it. Plasticity 
surfaced most clearly in relation to education in John Dewey’s Democracy and Education (1916), 
itself a text influenced by Hegel.2 More recently Catherine Malabou has introduced the 
neurobiological use of the concept to a philosophical context. Although she has not written explicitly 
on education or on Dewey, her approach to plasticity greatly extends its meaning. In its simplest 
formulation plasticity articulates the capacity for the taking on of form, the giving of form and the 
destruction of form. For Dewey, plasticity decreases with age. He therefore only emphasises its 
significance in the early stages of life and learning. Malabou, on the other hand, gives no such 
emphasis. For her, the concept articulates a responsibility towards the forming, self-forming and 
destruction of identities much more generally. This approach opens a way towards thinking plasticity 
as being applicable from the earliest conceivable educational settings and also to what might be 
called re-education for adults. With plasticity it is possible to destroy as well as create, so re-
education seems an appropriate term for the idea that plasticity allows us to start a re-conceived 
notion of education again at any point. In Malabou’s understanding, gaining knowledge of plasticity 
and its social, political and ethical implications, inspires a new responsibility towards our selves 
ourselves and others. Unless we choose to ignore our plasticity, once we realise that we are plastic 
we must be responsive to that fact. This would mean rethinking, reinventing and re-educating our 
identities and our social institutions in terms of plasticity. Plasticity creates a new responsibility 
because it changes the ways in which we are able to think about ourselves and our societies.  
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The recognition of another’s self-consciousness is a trait of Hegelian dialectics and Malabou 
takes this further by recognising that self-consciousness is fundamentally plastic. Like Hegel and 
Dewey, she connects plasticity with good and bad habit forming. Her reading of Hegel is not 
particularly unorthodox but her emphasis on his use of plasticity and the subsequent connections 
she draws between his thinking and that of Heidegger and Derrida bring about new ways of thinking 
which are not simply Hegelian. This is exemplified by the fact that, unlike Hegel and Dewey, she 
repeatedly engages with the destructive aspect of plasticity and its potential to ‘explode’ form, or its 
specific manifestation as bad habits. She does not focus on a linear progression towards absolute 
knowledge but rather sees plasticity as something which can interrupt rigid and negative ways of 
being as a form of re-education. In this way, Malabou not only offers a new way back to Dewey, 
including the opportunity to rethink aspects of his educational philosophy in a contemporary 
context, but also a means of thinking the interruption or destruction of many of the bad-habit-
forming and flexibility-oriented conceptions of education that exist today. This paper will examine 
her conception of plasticity as not only providing an opportunity but also ‘the feeling of a new 
responsibility’ (Malabou, 2008, p. 14) towards the plastic subject in philosophical approaches to 
education and re-education. 
 
Malabou’s Plasticity 
Malabou’s concept of plasticity is derived from several sources, which inform and extend the 
meaning of the concept in philosophical terms. There is no stock definition of plasticity and it is 
arguable that the problems inherent in examining it play a part in demonstrating the plurality and 
creativity of her philosophical approach: plasticity is itself plastic.3 There are points where seemingly 
clear definitions are given in her work but these are multiple and not always superficially 
complementary, as such, the most appropriate introductory definition might be that ‘Plasticity refers 
to the spontaneous organization of fragments’ (Malabou, 2010, p. 7).4 However, she also repeats a 
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more formal definition of its ‘three principal significations’ in several of her texts, most lucidly in The 
New Wounded: ‘On the one hand, it designates the capacity of certain materials, such as clay or 
plaster, to receive form. On the other hand, it designates the power to give form – the power of a 
sculptor or a plastic surgeon. But, finally, it also refers to the possibility of the deflagration or 
explosion of every form…’(Malabou, 2012b, p.17). After providing an initial overview of the contexts 
within which this concept is explored, the focus of this paper will be narrowed to allow for a closer 
inspection of what relationship plasticity has to responsibility. Plasticity will be shown to not only 
play a part in responsibility towards others and oneself but also, and perhaps more crucially, to 
demand, inspire or provoke that responsibility. This demonstration, alongside a reading of Dewey’s 
approach to ‘habit’ and his more limited use of the concept of plasticity, will itself provoke and lay 
the foundation for an apprehension of how plasticity could be put to work in formal or informal 
educational contexts as well as in terms of re-education.  
How plasticity is to be thought of in relation to education and re-education can be 
considered either in terms of ostensibly philosophical or educational contexts. These two contexts 
overlap more usually in theory than in practice. The philosophical concepts and positions that 
Malabou is responding to and transforming have only had limited or peripheral influence on 
educational thinking. While many texts have been written on the educational significance and 
applicability of Hegel, Heidegger and Derrida, there is not much evidence of their explicit practical 
application. The exception might be Hegel, if only indirectly through the influence of John Dewey. As 
such, Dewey will be given special consideration alongside Malabou for his explicit application of the 
concept of plasticity to philosophical and educational thinking. Malabou does not seek to give 
exhaustive readings of Hegel, Heidegger and Derrida – and has seemingly not yet engaged with 
Dewey’s thinking in her writing - only taking what she considers to be the relevant aspects of their 
philosophies into direct account in the manifestation of her philosophical project. As such, while the 
specific delineation of her thinking from work done on the potential of Hegelian, Heideggerian or 
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Derridean educational thinking will not be attempted here, the development of her conception of 
plasticity will be outlined in her readings of these thinkers. This approach will highlight the 
applicability of her concept of plasticity to educational thinking generally. 
 
The Plasticity of the Teachable Subject 
 
Malabou began and continues to begin her definition and untangling of the concept of plasticity 
from Hegel’s writings. In her reading, Hegel offers a perspective on the concept which is 
indispensable, even if it only expresses a few aspects of what she wants plasticity to mean in her 
own thinking. His offering is that of the self as plastic in its ability to change while still remaining 
somewhat the same and somewhat robust as a self-identifiable subject.5 Her Hegel offers plasticity 
as a ‘reconquering of presence’ which is facilitated by the returning of a subject to itself but also for 
whom ‘plasticity signifies the disruption and deflagration of presence’ (Malabou, 2010, p. 9). This 
reconquering would also relate to the Hegelian recognition of others as self-conscious and plastic 
subjects. Recognition extends the concept of plasticity beyond how we may re-educate ourselves to 
how we relate with and teach others. The responsibility this engenders would have to acknowledge 
that Malabou’s version of Hegel’s dialectic explodes the subject without destroying it and considers 
it as being in a constant process of transformation: the self appears through the dialectical process 
of plastic change. Hegel’s dialectical fulfilment of history is analogised by Malabou with the plastic in 
what she calls the image of ‘a plastic system, a supple form capable of welcoming whatever arrives’ 
(Malabou, 2010, p. 34). He provides her with the means of conceptualising subjective form, in its 
self-identifiability, as transformable and transformative. To read in a Hegelian manner, which is her 
preferred application of the plasticity of the dialectic, is to be able ‘to see (what is) coming’ 
(Malabou, 2005, p. 184). This is both to be literally able to see what is coming but also to always see 
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that change is coming. Hegelian plastic reading is anticipatory because it has a history which is 
located immanently in presence and yet is always undergoing transformation. The impressions that 
the plastic form of a subject takes on contribute to its individuality and context, making up its history 
but only ever as a continuously transforming present.  Even though a subject is present to itself, it is 
not primarily defined by what it is at any given moment but rather by its transformability as the 
‘internal mobility of the system’ (Malabou, 2010, p. 68). 
The idea of a self-identifiable subject that Malabou’s reading of Hegel affords to plasticity is 
thought at the same time as the plastic inseparability of Being from beings in her reading of 
Heidegger.6 The complete rejection of the transcendental that she finds in Heidegger (and lends to 
the rest of her thinking) helps Malabou to think plasticity as a connective and transformative quality 
of Being, which includes beings. For Malabou’s Hegel it is the plasticity of the subject that is 
significant but for her Heidegger the emphasis is on the plasticity of Being. Dasein is inseparable 
from Being (Sein) and even though it might, in her reading, have the self-identifiable subjectivity that 
is also found in Hegel, what is more important for Malabou is ‘the very movement of being’ 
(Malabou, 2010, p. 68). That is to say, it is Being itself which is fundamentally plastic and constantly 
modifies itself. There is no inside or outside to Being, no interiority or exteriority, which is why 
Malabou finds plasticity useful when considering Heidegger. Plasticity allows for the conception of 
internal structural change without addition or removal. It is not possible to be transcendentally or 
metaphysically outside of presence but rather one is constantly entering it: ‘In the end essence does 
not say presence; it says entry into presence, in other words, an originary movement that, again, is 
the movement of change or exchange’ (Malabou, 2011a, p. 136). The originary movement is itself 
plastic and its action exhibits the qualities of plasticity.  
For Malabou’s materialist concept of plasticity to operate in the way she intends, Derrida’s 
concept of ‘trace’ must be overcome. For Derrida, ‘The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in 
general. Which amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of trace in general’ 
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(Derrida, 1998, p. 65). As such, because ‘plasticity describes the nature of that which is plastic, being 
at once capable of receiving and giving form’ (Malabou, 2010, p. 67) it cannot accommodate 
Derrida’s trace, which is the erasure of form and the interruption of presence. Derrida would also 
not be able to conceive of plasticity as being the originary concept under which of this receiving and 
giving of form occurs because for him there are no such origins. For plasticity to function within the 
context of the predicates defined by Malabou’s readings of Hegel and Heidegger, there is no room 
for the trace in Derrida’s sense and therefore it must be given a ‘form’ and reduced to presence and 
her materialist perspective. Malabou herself is clear that ‘from the outset, then, the theorization of 
writing destabilized [her] fragile discovery of the plasticity of presence’ (Malabou, 2010, p. 11). 
Despite this she states without reservation that ‘plasticity is now the privileged supplement/schema 
of our epoch, interrupting the tracing of the trace with the formation of the form’ (Malabou, 2011a, 
p. 63). It is the formation of form and the ‘modifiability of concepts’ (Malabou, 2011a, p. 64) that 
plasticity affords which is of primary interest to Malabou.  
Malabou also finds another ally in Freud for her interpretation of plasticity. The primary 
definition of psychological plasticity that she uncovers in his texts is as ‘the possibility of being 
transformed without being destroyed; it characterizes the entire strategy of modification that seeks 
to avoid the threat of destruction’ (Malabou, 2012a, p. 44-45). The second definition is plasticity as 
the ability of the libido to ‘change its object, not to remain fixed, the capacity to change its 
investments’ (Malabou, 2012a, p. 45). Effectively this means the retention of the ability for the libido 
to remain free. The Ontology of the Accident and The New Wounded both articulate ways of 
conceiving plasticity in a negative, destructive sense as well as its more common, positive usage, 
particularly in the language of neurology. She argues that, ‘No one thinks spontaneously about a 
plastic art of destruction. Yet destruction too is formative. A smashed up face is still a face, a stump a 
limb, a traumatized psyche remains a psyche. Destruction has its own sculpting tools’ (Malabou, 
2012a, p. 4). For her, the ‘only valid philosophical path today lies in the elaboration of a new 
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materialism that would precisely refuse to envisage the least separation, not only between the brain 
and thought but also between the brain and the unconscious’ (Malabou, 2012b, p. 211-212). To aid 
her in this pursuit she introduces the concept of ‘cerebrality’ (Malabou, 2012b, p. 1) and argues that 
‘Cerebral activity goes well beyond the mere work of cognition, and even of consciousness, to 
encompass the affective, sensory, and erotic fabric without which neither cognition nor 
consciousness would exist.’ (Malabou, 2012b, p. 4). This undermines the self-certainty of the self-
identifiable subject but also reveals the extent to which plasticity can be considered and applied, 
where it arises from and where it can be altered or affected. While this perspective illustrates 
Malabou’s somewhat Derridean desire to bring different theoretical languages together, it is 
perhaps also inspired by the Heideggerian imperative to see the whole of Being as consistent with 
itself.  In this sense, plasticity also acts as an adhesive for Malabou, allowing her to connect different 
approaches in a productive manner. They interrupt one another and show the malleability and 
accommodative qualities that plasticity is afforded in her hands. In her What Should We Do With Our 
Brain?, she takes even wider aim, combining neurological literature on brain plasticity with a critique 
of the ideological implications of not taking this research seriously. Concluding that it is only when 
we ‘grasp the political, economic, social, and cultural implications of the knowledge of cerebral 
plasticity available today’ (Malabou, 2008, p. 82) that we can do anything with it. 
 
Learning Plasticity as Habit  
Given Hegel’s influence on Dewey it is unsurprising that he applied his own reading of the subject-
oriented concepts of plasticity and habit to education in Democracy and Education. For Malabou 
also, the idea of habit is essential to thinking of Hegel as the philosopher who makes it possible to 
‘see (what is) coming’ writing that, ‘Human beings are those who, in order to be, must observe that 
speculative clock which is habit, a clock which makes it possible to ‘see (what is) coming’, meaning 
that the end can be brought forward and, at the same time, postponed’ (Malabou, 2005, p. 76). For 
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her Hegel, ‘Habit is the process whereby the contingent becomes essential’ (Malabou, 2005, p. 74). 
Similarly, Dewey’s plasticity  
is essentially the ability to learn from experience; the power to retain from one experience 
something which is of avail in coping with the difficulties of a later situation. This means 
power to modify actions on the basis of the results of prior experiences, the power to 
develop dispositions. Without it, the acquisition of habits is impossible. (Dewey, 1916, p. 44) 
It is perhaps also unsurprising that it is within the context of the thinking of the learners’ plasticity 
that Dewey develops his conception of learning to learn, wherein, ‘the human being acquires a habit 
of learning. He learns to learn’ (Dewey, 1916, p. 45). Therefore, the same kinds of thinking which 
have been applied to the idea of ‘learning to learn’ might be applied to the plasticity of the learner. 
For Dewey, plasticity is entirely analogous to the ‘power to learn’, writing that, ‘Plasticity or the 
power to learn from experience means the formation of habits’ (Dewey, 1916, p. 52). Learning to 
learn might even be conceived of as learning to be aware of plasticity and its potential consequences 
for (our) existence. This perspective is assisted by Dewey’s critique of ‘fixed habits’ (Dewey, 1916, p. 
47-49), which could just as easily be a critique of rigidity and flexibility. For him, ‘Routine habits, and 
habits that possess us instead of our possessing them, are habits which put an end to plasticity’ 
(Dewey, 1916, p. 49).  
This idea of being possessed by habits is also helpfully analogous to Malabou’s thinking on 
habits as haunting the psyche which she articulates alongside readings of Ravaisson and Derrida. In 
her preface to Felix Ravaisson’s Of Habit, Malabou outlines two ‘basic ways of speaking about habit’ 
(Malabou, 2008, p. vii). For Aristotle, Hegel and Ravaisson, habit is ‘a primary ontological 
phenomenon…the law of being’ (Malabou, 2008, p. vii). This is opposed to the definition of habit she 
attributes to Descartes and Kant, which sees it as ‘the epitome of inauthenticity, a simulacrum of 
being, an imitation of virtue’ which ‘stifles the voice…of the categorical imperative’ (Malabou, 2008, 
p. vii). Dewey’s critique of fixed habits and Malabou’s insistence on the destructive aspect of 
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plasticity demonstrate their alignment with the former school of thinking but also their desire to 
untangle themselves from the problems posed by the latter. Malabou parses the content of 
Ravaisson’s 1838 essay in contemporary philosophical language, returning again to the reduction of 
the trace to presence that was found in her critique of Derrida, writing that  
The trace has inscribed in being the very possibility of changing. With habit, the memory of 
change is one with the possibility of change in general. If being was able to change once, in 
the manner of contracting a habit, it can change again. It is available for a change to come. 
Certainly, change generates habit, but in return habit is actualized as a habit of changing. 
Being is thus habituated to its future. It has a future. (Malabou, 2008, p. viii) 
Malabou does not mention plasticity here but it is clear that her interest in habit follows from her 
thinking on it. Plasticity would incorporate or accommodate all of the qualities which are also 
afforded to habit in Aristotle, Hegel and Ravaisson’s thinking. A being which is ‘habituated to its 
future’ might also just as easily be a learner who, like Dewey’s, has learned to learn, itself an 
actualization of the habit of changing.  
Malabou extends her reading of Derrida’s relationship to Ravaisson’s thinking by turning 
Derrida’s own reading of Ravaisson from On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy on its head. She argues that 
although Ravaisson formulates the principle of the ‘psyche as always haunted…badly, or clumsily’ 
(Malabou, 2008, p. xviii), this should not undermine the fact that he does manage to conceive of a 
haunted psyche at all, and should therefore not be subject to Derrida’s critique. This is important 
because Derrida’s dismissal of pure auto-affection is thought in terms of ‘a pharmakon that already 
having at its disposal a dwelling in this place inhabits one’s heart of hearts as a ghost’ (Derrida in 
Malabou, 2008, p. xix). For her, habit is this pharmakon, ‘at once poison and remedy’ (Malabou, 
2008, p. xix). She implies that the rejection of habit, alongside the deconstruction of presence might 
itself have become a pharmakon-like habit or tic. To counter this she implores the reader to prepare 
themselves to ‘get out of the habit of rejecting habit, to habituate yourself to habit!’ (Malabou, 
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2008, p. xx). Learning would then be the learning of habits and, first and foremost, the learning of 
the habit to learn. However, alongside this more ‘positive’ aspect of plasticity would also be a 
destructive unlearning of negative habits.  
 
The Educational Responsibility to Plasticity 
What Should We Do With Our Brain? is a title which attempts to inspire a call to response as well as 
simply pose and answer a question. Malabou’s approach in this book is to convey research on 
neurobiological brain plasticity alongside her own philosophical thinking so as to facilitate what she 
considers to be a liberatory perspective on the brain. The danger she perceives as the counter to the 
liberation potentially afforded by brain plasticity is that without an awareness and desire to utilise 
knowledge of it, brains will default to the dominant ideological system, i.e. neoliberal capitalism.7 If 
individuals do not take responsibility for their own brains then they are not being as responsible as 
they could be with their own lives. The problem for Malabou is that most people do not realise the 
plasticity of their brains are therefore unable to be responsible to it. However, once plasticity is 
recognised, that knowledge itself presents a responsibility. For Malabou, the question of what we 
should do with our brain seems primarily to be one of responsibility, arguing emphatically that it is a 
‘question for everyone’ with which she ‘seeks to give birth in everyone to the feeling of a new 
responsibility’ (Malabou, 2008, p. 14). She opposes the concept of plasticity to the concepts of 
rigidity and flexibility. Rigidity implying that we cannot change or adapt but are almost fatalistically 
fixed in our brains and their predeterminations; flexibility implying that we cannot change our brains 
but we can adapt them to different contexts and stimuli, grasping only one aspect of the concept of 
plasticity, ‘that of receiving form’ rather than ‘giving form’ (Malabou, 2008, p. 12).The problem for 
Malabou is that it is not just that most social or educational contexts are organised in line with an 
acceptance and perpetuation of the rigid or flexible rather than plastic, it is that even within the 
neurosciences ‘many descriptions of plasticity are in fact unconscious justifications of a flexibility 
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without limits’ (Malabou, 2008, p. 13). For her it is not an evaluation of the brain as it is that is of 
particular interest but rather to anticipate or bring about the possibilities of the brain afforded by 
the concept of plasticity (Malabou, 2008, p. 10). She wants her readers to ‘construct and entertain a 
relation with their brain as the image of the world to come’ (Malabou, 2008, p. 82). For Malabou, 
changing our brains means changing our future and to be responsible to ourselves and others means 
to take on the challenge and opportunity of plasticity. The concept of ‘resilience’ is helpful to her in 
her definition of neuronal plasticity as ‘a logic of self-formation starting from the annihilation of 
form’, appearing as ‘a psychical process…of reconstruction and self-reconfiguration, developed 
simultaneously against and with the threat of destruction’ (Malabou, 2008, p. 76). Here again, the 
destructive component of plasticity is important in revealing its difference from flexibility. A flexible 
form cannot be destroyed and remade, it can only be impressed upon, including in terms of damage. 
Plastic forms can be remade or reimagined, even as parts of them are destroyed. The responsibility 
she is concerned with, then, is not just to what is, but to how what is can shape and even become 
what can be. 
In Counterpath, written with Derrida, Malabou discusses Derrida’s concept of responsibility 
in relation to the futurity of the self and the other. In her reading, ‘Being responsible involves letting 
the other come, making their voyage finally possible’ (Malabou & Derrida, 2004, p. 240). The ‘other’ 
is most usually thought of as another being but for both Malabou and Derrida, the other that comes 
could also be the other of oneself, oneself as other. For Derrida the self cannot be present to itself 
and there is no pure autoaffection, only heteroaffection. So where Malabou might see futurity as the 
possibility of the changing of oneself, for Derrida this would be conceived of as accounting for the 
excess of (im)possibilities that cannot be brought to consciousness. For Malabou it is the possibility 
of changing oneself while still remaining the same - thanks to her agreement with Hegel on his idea 
that there is a somewhat consistent self-identifiable subject - that plasticity allows for and that one 
is made responsible towards. This remains ‘possible’ for Malabou in her reading of Derrida because, 
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‘To be possible means to be undeniable. In this sense, what is possible appears as the pure and 
simple impossibility of being denied’ (Malabou & Derrida, 2004, p. 258). Another self is possible and 
undeniable, meaning that one’s responsibility towards this other self is equally undeniable. So, if 
plasticity is possible, and especially one’s own plasticity, there is an undeniable responsibility 
towards it and the change in oneself it facilitates. As such, re-education would, first and foremost, be 
an education in one’s own plasticity and, if Dewey and Malabou were read more widely through the 
lens of plasticity, education at all levels could be thought of in the same way. Learning that there are 
things it is possible to change in oneself through a re-education is itself a responsibility. To teach 
plasticity is to teach the way out of rigid or flexible ways of being generated by social and 
institutional teachings and practices. We learn to be rigid and flexible which means we can also learn 
to be plastic. However, this process of learning implies a re-education not just of the subject but of 
education itself. Re-education, then, is not just about transforming and liberating the individual 
subject who happens to fall upon and learn about the concept of plasticity; it also has the potential 
to effect significant social and institutional change. Detailed consequences of this thinking for policy 
and practice are beyond the remit of this paper but pointing the way towards re-education – and a 
re-education in how we think about education - is the only way to begin to inspire a responsibility 
towards it. 
In the final pages of The New Wounded Malabou suggests that the concept of responsibility 
must be thought of in terms of the experiences of those she terms the ‘new wounded’ or those ‘with 
brain lesions’ (Malabou, 2008, p. 17).  For her it is important to establish that the ‘”subject supposed 
to know” has been deposed in patients who do not want either to know or not to know’ (Malabou, 
2012b, p. 215). While this has many consequences for psychoanalytical and neuropsychoanalytical 
thinking, what is most interesting in an educational context is her statement that, ‘To gather the 
other’s pain is not to take his place, but to restore it to him’ (Malabou, 2012b, p. 215). What is 
facilitated here is the learning, or relearning, one’s own pain and the possibility for that pain, which 
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is also the restoration of place and identity. For her this is not a marginal issue as we are all always 
‘susceptible to becoming new wounded, prototypes of ourselves without any essential relation to 
the past of our identities’ (Malabou, 2012b, p. 213). More broadly speaking, to know is to be 
responsible, which is an idea not only relevant in terms of the ‘new wounded’ but to everyone in 
terms of their own plasticity. Responsibility can here be thought of as a part of plasticity and our 
ability to take on form and give form as well as a sensitivity towards destroying form or having it 
destroyed accidentally. To be restored to one’s pain is also to be made responsible to it. It is not 
possible to improve our lives if we cannot first diagnose and accept what is wrong with them. Clearly 
this is not an objective process; however, it is a plastic process. Again, this restoration of pain is not 
simply limited to individual subjects and can also be thought on a broader social and institutional 
level. What are society’s pains? How can they be restored to it so that they can either be overcome 
or responded to plastically?  
Clearly a concept which articulates a responsibility towards the forming, self-forming and 
destruction of identities and social spheres is one which can be thought of as being germane for 
educational thinking. To see knowledge as responsibility is not a new idea but the extent of the 
effect that the knowledge of our own plasticity might afford us takes that idea to another realm of 
significance. Malabou has herself learned and taught the concept of plasticity. The first section of 
this paper explored how Hegel, Heidegger, Derrida and Freud were all able to teach her different 
things about this concept and its variable applicability, as well as its possible limitations or the 
limitations its conceptualisation implies for other ways of thinking. Her own articulation of this 
learning process reveals how her theory is implicated in her writing practice. Her writing is presented 
always as a ‘reading’ and in Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing she returns to the concept of ‘plastic 
reading’ that she introduced in The Future of Hegel as ‘a new, transformed type of structural 
approach’ (Malabou, 2010, p. 51) and further that ‘The figural structure that we must try to reveal in 
texts…is a matter of causing the form that comes after presence to arise in works’ (Malabou, 2010, p. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Educational Philosophy 
and Theory on 14/04/15, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2015.1031067 
 
57). In this sense it is profoundly metamorphic rather than deconstructive. What is interesting to her 
is how forms can change and the agency that we have in being able to change them, as well as, 
perhaps more crucially, how our very form of agency can be changed. This is why she is, with the 
text of Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing itself, ‘trying to show how a being, in its fragile and finite 
mutability, can experience the materiality of existence and transform its ontological meaning’ 
(Malabou, 2010, p. 81) while also being a ‘brain that changes itself’ (Malabou, 2010, p. 82). 
 
Conclusion 
Malabou’s concept of plasticity has implications for the learner and the teacher as well as social and 
institutional practice more broadly. Of course, the learner themselves would be considered plastic. 
This would mean that they had the ability to take on form, give form and destroy form. The process 
of learning would be the metamorphosis of forms. The learner themselves would change and so 
would the forms that they conceive of.  The process of education would perhaps be considered a 
more delicate affair in many contexts because what would be at stake would not just be the forms 
that are impressed on the learner but also how they themselves are formed. However, the opposite 
might also be true, wherein, because of the possibility of re-education, mistakes can afford to be 
made. Plasticity allows for a thinking of education as the formation of the learner in a way which 
reveals several points of access and outcomes to this process. The becoming conscious of plasticity, 
or, the capacity to shape one’s own form and ability to give and receive form, would itself have to be 
learned. Here it might be possible to see a bridge between Aristotole’s hylomorphic thinking and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s anti-hylomorphic thinking. While Malabou does not explicitly write on this 
topic it is useful to align her thinking with hylomorphism because of what the concept of plasticity 
can do for it. While being a proponent of form and materialism, Malabou’s plasticity offers the tools 
to be able to destroy, create and change forms rather than simply accepting them. In her 
hylomorphic thinking forms are not rigid or flexible, they are plastic.  Educational systems which 
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think of the learner as either rigid in their capacities or simply flexible in their ability to adapt to 
different stimuli are not sensitive enough to their plasticity. An educational system which perceived 
the learners as rigid might, for example, be predisposed to early streaming or a separation between 
academic or vocational learners. A system which attempted to account primarily for flexibility might 
be less inclined to specialise as aggressively as the rigid system but would still imply a prioritisation 
of taking on forms rather than giving them. The agency of the learner is limited to their ability to 
adapt to a preordained system of education and socio-political life, rather than to conceive of 
themselves as active in its formation, as well as active in their formation (and potential for re-
formation) of their own self.  
The plastic learning and the learning of plasticity would be a re-education as well as an 
education. This would particularly be the case if Malabou is correct in assuming that we have little or 
no conscious or unconscious awareness of our own plasticity. If Dewey’s Democracy and Education 
was perhaps the unfulfilled (and conscious) formulation of a plastic education, what kind of 
programme would be required to interrupt or even destroy the bad-habit-forming and flexibility-
oriented conception of education that exists in its place? To learn of plasticity is, in a sense to 
become responsible to it. Of course, that responsibility can be ignored and rejected but the 
combination of a scientific and philosophical argument for its existence and relevance might 
increase its perceived validity.  
The potential of the concept of plasticity to be utilised in conventional educational contexts 
(particularly schools) would, I argue, best be served by a return to Dewey and an exploration of the 
relevant influences his educational ideas have had, both in terms of their failures and successes. 
However, thinking the concept of plasticity and its educational significance in terms of re-education 
has the potential for a different set of applications. Leaving the philosophical implications and 
problems of the concept to one side, its interruptive potential is significant. It is, in many ways, what 
might be considered an ‘empowering’ or, to stay with Malabou’s terms, a ‘liberatory’ concept. It 
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offers the knowledge of a re-forming of oneself, either in terms of giving form, taking on form or 
destroying form. It implies a certain confidence in the ability to perhaps recover from depression, 
reform from criminal behaviour or retrain for a different career. It offers all of these possibilities 
without disarticulating beings from themselves or from the world. It is not a ‘postmodern’ concept, 
it is a materialist concept and as such situates itself firmly in lived experience. It provides the 
possibility for facilitating what might be called a controlled metamorphosis. It is also, as Malabou 
argues, a concept of resistance and in many ways this might provide its primary function as well as 
what extends its educational value beyond a return to Dewey. For him, plasticity is only particularly 
significant in terms of growth and only the young are particularly plastic, for him ‘there can be no 
doubt of the tendency of organic plasticity, of the physiological basis, to lessen with growing years’ 
(Dewey, 1916, 49). That is not to say he would not have been open to other ways of articulating 
plasticity, it is simply that he did not.   
In contradistinction to Dewey’s growth oriented notion of plasticity, Malabou answers her 
own question of What Should We Do With Our Brain? with the response that, ‘To cancel the fluxes, 
to lower our self-controlling guard, to accept exploding from time to time: this is what we should do 
with our brain’ (Malabou, 2008, 79). This is not so much about growth as a positive form of self-
destruction and a delegitimising of a rigid conception of self. This perspective might help to 
formulate a response to the problem of ‘fixed habits’ that Dewey raises but does not offer a solution 
to. It is here that Malabou’s thinking of plasticity offers something original to education: a 
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1 Malabou, C. (2008) What Should We Do with Our Brain?, S. Rand, trans, in: M. Jeannerod (New 
York, Fordham University Press), p. 14. 
2 For extensive evidence in support of this claim, see in particular Good, J.A. (2006) A Search for 
Unity in Diversity: The “permanent Hegelian deposit” in the philosophy of John Dewey (Oxford: 
Lexington Books). 
 
3 Malabou does herself use some dictionary definitions of plasticity as a part of her examination of 
the concept but these only provide a very small part of her exposition of it.  
 
4 All emphasis given in citations in this paper are present in the original texts. 
 
5Although Malabou examines a huge spectrum of Hegel’s work in The Future of Hegel, the texts best 
suited for further exploration of the context for the concept of plasticity in his work are probably 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1977), Science of Logic (1989) and Aesthetics (1975). I have hesitated from 
reciting Malabou’s citations, given that it is her being read here rather than Hegel, and instead list 
the references for these texts in the bibliography, while recommending a close reading The Future of 
Hegel as a primary introduction. 
 
6 As above, Being and Time (1996) provides the best context for Malabou’s interpretation of 
Heidegger’s philosophy as a means to her conceptualisation of plasticity. 
 
7 It is almost certainly possible to align Malabou’s thinking on the liberation of brain with the ideas 
contained in Paulo Freire’s The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, but because he does not (unlike Dewey) 
explicitly engage with the concept of plasticity, an examination of this here would be beyond the 
remit of this paper. However, this paper hopes to open a way towards thinking plasticity as a 
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